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REFORMING INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN THE
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Giancarlo F. Frosio*
ABSTRACT—Since the enactment of the first safe harbors and liability
exemptions for online intermediaries like Google and Facebook, market
conditions have radically changed. Originally, intermediary liability
exemptions were introduced to promote an emerging internet market. Do
safe harbors for online intermediaries still serve innovation? Should they be
limited or expanded? These critical questions—often tainted by
protectionist concerns—define the present intermediary liability
conundrum. Today, safe harbors still hold, but secondary liability is on the
rise. In its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission plans
to introduce sectorial legislation that would effectively erode liability
exemptions for online intermediaries, especially platforms. In an attempt to
close a “value gap” between rightholders and online platforms allegedly
exploiting protected content, the proposal would implement filtering
obligations for intermediaries and introduce neighboring rights for online
uses of press publications. Meanwhile, an upcoming revision of the AudioVisual Media Services Directive would ask platforms to put in place
measures to protect minors from harmful content and to protect everyone
from incitement to hatred. Finally, the EU Digital Single Market Strategy
has endorsed voluntary measures as a privileged tool to curb illicit and
infringing activities online. This Essay contextualizes the recent EU reform
proposal within a broader move towards turning online intermediaries into
internet police. This narrative builds exclusively upon governmental or
content industry assumptions, rather than empirical evidence. Also, the
intermediary liability discourse is shifting towards an intermediary
responsibility discourse. Apparently, the European Commission aligns its
strategy for online platforms to a globalized, ongoing move towards
privatization of enforcement online through algorithmic tools. This process
may advance an amorphous notion of responsibility that incentivizes
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INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-nineties, legislators have provided online
intermediaries, such as access or hosting providers, with exemptions from
liability for wrongful activities committed by users through their services.1
In most cases, safe harbor legislations provide “mere conduit,” caching,
and hosting exemptions for intermediaries. Safe harbor legislation usually
does not require intermediaries to monitor the information that they
transmit or store, or to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating
illegal activity.2 Nonetheless, recent international policy debates have
recalibrated towards more secondary liability for online intermediaries. In
particular, the European Commission has been seriously considering
narrowing the eCommerce Directive horizontal liability limitations for

1

For most worldwide safe harbor legislations, see World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap),
THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, STAN. L. SCH., http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/our-work/projects/
world-intermediary-liability-map-wilmap [https://perma.cc/84L7-VRTU] (last visited June 3, 2017)
(presenting a project designed and developed by the author).
2
See, e.g., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A–C) (2012)
[hereinafter DMCA]; Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the
Internal Market 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 2 (EC) [hereinafter eCommerce Directive].
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internet intermediaries3 and putting in place a “fit for purpose regulatory
environment for platforms and intermediaries.”4
I.

A DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET STRATEGY FOR INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY

In May 2015, the European Union (EU) Commission issued its Digital
Single Market Strategy (DSMS), announcing steps to be taken “towards a
connected digital single market” and plans to reform EU copyright.5 The
theme of the DSMS is “[b]ringing down barriers to unlock online
opportunities” with the aim of moving the EU from “28 national markets to
a single one.”6 Reforms proposed by the DSMS address topics including
ecommerce, cross-border sales, and copyright.7 The Digital Single Market
Strategy focuses on four main issues: (1) cross-border access to content, (2)
text- and data-mining, (3) civil enforcement, and (4) the role of ISPs.8 In
particular, the Commission noted:
An effective and balanced civil enforcement system against commercial scale
infringements of copyright is central to investment in innovation and job
creation. In addition the rules applicable to activities of online intermediaries
in relation to copyright protected works require clarification, given in
particular the growing involvement of these intermediaries in content
distribution. Measures to safeguard fair remuneration of creators also need to
be considered in order to encourage the future generation of content.9

Apparently, the European Commission plans to enhance the
obligations that websites and other internet intermediaries have when
3

See Patrick Van Eecke, Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach,
48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2011) (“Section 4 [of the eCommerce Directive] introduces a
horizontal special liability regime for the three types of service providers covered by it. Provided they
meet the criteria laid down in Section 4, the service providers will be exempted from contractual
liability, administrative liability, tortious/extra-contractual liability, penal liability, civil liability or any
other type of liability, for all types of activities initiated by third parties, including copyright and trade
mark infringements, defamation, misleading advertising, unfair commercial practices, unfair
competition, publications of illegal content, etc.”).
4
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy
for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015), at § 3.3 [hereinafter Digital Single Market Strategy].
5
Id. (citing Jean-Claude Juncker, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission—A New
Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (July 15, 2014)).
6
See Priority: Digital Single Market, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http:/ec.europa.eu/priorities/digitalsingle-market_en [https://perma.cc/G8LU-A5JN] (last visited June 3, 2017).
7
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Addressing
Geo-Blocking and Other Forms of Discrimination Based on Customers’ Nationality, Place of Residence
or Place of Establishment Within the Internal Market and Amending Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004
and Directive 2009/22/EC, COM (2016) 289 final (May 25, 2016).
8
Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 4, at §§ 2.1–4, 3.3.
9
Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 4, at § 2.4 (emphasis added).
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dealing with unlawful third-party content.10 These enhanced responsibilities
would apply when intermediaries deal with illegal content, such as child
pornography, terrorist materials, and content that infringes upon intellectual
property rights.11 In particular, the Commission is discussing what
regulations should apply to a subset of those intermediaries deemed “online
platforms” and “whether to require intermediaries to exercise greater
responsibility and due diligence in the way they manage their networks and
systems—a duty of care.”12 It is worth noting that some European national
jurisdictions are already in the process of implementing some form of a
“duty of care.”13 The German coalition agreement, for example,
emphasized that “internet service providers should take more
responsibility” for mass copyright infringement.14 Specifically, the German
coalition plans to “improve enforcement in particular towards platforms
whose business model is mainly based on the infringement of copyright”
by ensuring “that such service providers no longer enjoy the general
liability privilege as so-called hosting provider and in particular no longer
receive advertising revenues.”15
The DSMS was followed by a number of other actions to bring
Europe up to speed in the digital market. Some of these actions are
especially relevant for intermediary liability. First, the Commission
released a new Communication, Towards a Modern, More European
Copyright Framework,16 anticipating that policy and legislative action
would be taken in respect to: (1) exceptions to digital and cross-borders
environments;17 (2) exclusive rights, including both clarifying issues facing
linking to other content and considering whether any action specific to

10

Id. at §§ 3.3.1–2.
Id. at § 3.3.2.
12
Id.
13
See eCommerce Directive, supra note 2, at Recital 48, (establishing that “[t]his Directive does
not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who host information
provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from
them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal
activities”) (emphasis added).
14
See Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18
Legislaturperiode (December 17, 2013), 133–34, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/
_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-koalitionsvertrag.pdf
15
Id. at 133.
16
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Modern,
More European Copyright Framework, COM (2015) 260 final (Dec. 9, 2015).
17
Id. at 6–9; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, on
Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content Services in the Internal Market, COM (2015)
627 final (Dec. 9, 2015).
11
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news aggregators is needed;18 and (3) enforcement, including “follow the
money” strategies, commercial-scale infringements, application of
provisional and precautionary measures, injunctions and their cross-border
effect, notice and action mechanisms, and the “take down and stay down”
principle.19
Meanwhile, the Commission also launched a “public consultation on
the evaluation and modernization of the legal framework for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”20 This consultation discusses
reform within the DSMS that will affect liability of online intermediaries.
Provisions established by the Enforcement Directive on topics including
legal action, the right of information, damages and costs, and provisional
and precautionary measures might soon be revisited.21 In particular,
injunctions against online intermediaries might be considered in the next
round of reforms. European law might be amended by explicitly
establishing that all types of intermediaries can be enjoined and no specific
intermediaries’ liability or violation of any duty of care would be required
to issue an injunction.22 Apparently, the Commission might also like to
clarify or update the European Court of Justice’s position in Telekabel.23
First, the Commission might introduce criteria for defining the
proportionality of an injunction.24 Additionally, the Enforcement Directive
might be amended to “clarif[y] . . . how to balance the effective
implementation” of enforcement measures and users’ “right to freedom of
information” in case of a blocking order that does not specify the measures
that a service provider must take.25

18

Towards a Modern, More European Copyright Framework, supra note 16, at 9–10.
Id. at 10–11; see also Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523
(2015).
20
See Public Consultation on the Evaluation and Modernization of the Legal Framework for IPR
Enforcement: Summary of Responses, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Commission].
21
See Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29
April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 16–17 [hereinafter
Enforcement Directive].
22
See Commission, supra note 20, at 36.
23
See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega
Filmproducktionsgesellschaft mbH, 2014 E.C.R. 192 (Mar. 27, 2014) (stating that EU law does not
preclude a court “injunction [that] does not specify the measures which that access provider must take”
to block access to a copyright-infringing website).
24
See Commission, supra note 20, at 36–37.
25
Id. at 36.
19
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II. UNCHANGED INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY REGIME? THE DEVIL IS IN THE
SECTORIAL LEGISLATION AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES
The Commission also launched a public consultation on the role and
responsibilities of online intermediaries and platforms.26 The consultation
raised a number of pointed questions about the intermediary liability
framework in the EU.27 In particular, Section 3 of the Consultation,
Tackling Illegal Content Online and the Liability of Online Intermediaries,
questioned whether the eCommerce Directive’s reference to “mere
technical, automatic and passive” activity by intermediaries is sufficiently
clear;28 whether additional categories of intermediaries should be
established;29 whether particular types of content merit different notice-andaction procedures;30 whether action should include “take down and stay
down” or prospective monitoring for flagged content;31 and whether there
should be imposed specific duties of care for certain intermediaries.32
“A consensus emerged from the consultation” that the “existing
liability principles on which the Section IV of the E-Commerce Directive is
based are fit-for-purpose.”33 Therefore, the Commission published a
communication, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, which
apparently endorses maintaining the existing intermediary liability
regime.34 However, this broad programmatic statement might be deceiving.
As usual, the devil is in the details. The Commission did stress that “a
number of specific issues relating to illegal and harmful content and
activities online have been identified that need to be addressed,”35 which
26

See QUESTIONNAIRE, REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR PLATFORMS, ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES,
DATA AND CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY, EUROPEAN COMM’N; Public
Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud
Computing and the Collaborative Economy, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-onlineintermediaries-data-and-cloud [https://perma.cc/D43H-36ZC].
27
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 26, at 5.
28
Id. at 17, 19; see also eCommerce Directive, supra note 2, at Recital 42.
29
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 26, at 19.
30
Id. at 19–21.
31
Id. at 20–21.
32
Id. at 21–23.
33
See Full Report on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for
Platforms, Online Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 25,
2016),
https:/ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/full-report-results-public-consultationregulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries [https://perma.cc/5UJ2-RANY].
34
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Online Platforms and
the Digital Single Market: Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM (2016) 288 final, at 9 (May
25, 2016) [hereinafter OP&DSM Communication].
35
Id. at 8.
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suggests that online intermediaries’ liability relating to certain categories of
illegal content could be expanded.
In light of the Commission’s conclusion that the current liability
regime is generally adequate, but specific problems still need to be
addressed, the Commission suggested a “sectorial, problem-driven
approach”36 that implements different policy approaches for different
categories of illegal content. Apparently, this sectorial action will target
copyright-protected content, minors’ protection from harmful content, and
incitement through hatred.37 In other words, according to the Commission,
intermediary liability should be expanded by imposing an obligation on
online platforms to behave responsibly by addressing specific contentrelated problems.
The Commission recommends addressing these content-specific issues
with a mix of legislative interventions—by updating the audio-visual and
copyright regulations—and voluntary self-regulatory actions.38 The
Commission specifically encouraged immediate self-regulatory efforts by
online intermediaries that are designed to fight incitement to terrorism and
prevent hate speech.39 The OP&DSM Communication puts forward the idea
that the responsibility of online platforms is “wid[ening]” and has become a
key, cross-cutting issue.40 In doing so, the Commission has endorsed a
strategy that shifts the policy approach from intermediary liability to
intermediary responsibility, with special emphasis on voluntary measures
from intermediaries to curb undesired conduct—and speech—online. As an
immediate result of this new policy trend, the Commission recently agreed
with all major online hosting providers—including Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and Microsoft—on a “code of conduct that includes a series of
commitments to combat the spread of illegal hate speech online in
Europe.”41 Apparently, the Commission aligns its strategy for online
platforms to a globalized, ongoing movement towards privatization of law
enforcement online through algorithmic tools.42
36

See id. at 9.
Id. at 8–9.
38
Id. at 9.
39
Id. at 8–9.
40
Id. at 7–9.
41
See European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commission and IT Companies
Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech (May 31, 2016); Fighting Illegal Online
Hate Speech: First Assessment of the New Code of Conduct, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Dec. 6, 2016),
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=50840 (urging platforms to do more to implement
the code of conduct) [https://perma.cc/Y6AM-SP9L].
42
See Joe McNamee, Leaked EU Communication—Part 1: Privatized Censorship and
Surveillance, EDRI (Apr. 27, 2016), https://edri.org/leaked-eu-communication-privatised-censorshipand-surveillance [https://perma.cc/UFV8-Q4RB].
37
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Despite their focus on voluntary intermediary self-regulation, the
Commission’s proposals do include an important role for legislative
intervention. In particular, the Commission proposes updating the AudioVisual Media Services Directive to address the proliferation of hate speech
and content that is harmful to minors on online video sharing
platforms.43This sector-specific regulation would require platforms to put in
place measures to protect minors from harmful content and to protect
everyone from incitement to hatred.44 Commentators have been concerned
that the AVMS revision might erode the eCommerce Directive “no
monitoring obligations” for video platforms—especially if the “harmful”
content category is to be interpreted more broadly than “illegal” content.45
Therefore, the AVMS Draft revision also represents an expansion of
intermediary liability.
III. COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET: CLOSING THE VALUE
GAP?
The Communication also suggested promoting a fairer allocation of
value generated by the distribution of copyright-protected content online.46
The Commission presented its suggestion for a platform-sensitive update of
EU copyright policy in a proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital
Single Market.47 This draft directive is part of a larger package aimed at
modernizing EU copyright rules and achieving a fully functioning Digital
Single Market.
The draft directive aims, inter alia, to close the so-called “value gap”
between internet platforms and copyright holders. The idea of a “value
gap” echoes a discourse almost exclusively fabricated by the music and
entertainment industry. Apparently, this rhetorical device was coined for

43

See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services in
View of Changing Market Realities, COM (2016) 287 final (May 25, 2016) [hereinafter AVMS Draft]
(discussing these issues broadly in the “Explanatory Memorandum”).
44
Id. at Art. 6 & 28.
45
See Daphne Keller, Can a New Broadcasting Law in Europe Make Internet Host Monitor Their
Users?, CIS BLOG (May 27, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/05/can-newbroadcasting-law-europe-make-internet-hosts-monitor-their-users [https://perma.cc/8H3H-EWRK]; see
also AVMS Draft, supra note 43, at Art. 6
46
OP&DSM Communication, supra note 34, at 8 (emphasis added).
47
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016), 1, Art. 13 [hereinafter DSM Directive
Proposal].
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the first time in music industry global reports.48 After unsuccessful attempts
to seek judicial redress against user-generated content platforms (“UGC
platforms”),49 the industry decided to plead its case before the legislators
and seek legislative reform.50 Rightholders complained that the law—
specifically liability exemptions for UGC platforms, the lack of monitoring
obligations, and the notice and take-down regime—left them with no
ability to monetize the exchange of protected content on UGC platforms.
Rightholders suggested that, rather than entering into licensing agreements,
UGC platforms should offer to remove infringing content upon notice or
possibly implement voluntary measures like YouTube’s Content ID.51 As a
result, other platforms whose primary business is to sell content to users—
and therefore do not qualify for liability exemptions and must license
copyrights from rightholders—would be willing to pay less in licensing
fees in order to remain competitive with UGC platforms. Recently, the
same rhetoric has been redeployed in the United States. In an open letter to
President-elect Donald Trump, the music industry sought reform of safe
harbor legislation, pointing out that high-tech companies have thrived on
free music and the “value grab.”52
There are two major problems with this “value-grab” rhetoric. First, it
echoes an overexploited narrative identifying the internet as a digital threat
rather than a digital opportunity.53 These narratives undervalue the
opportunities that the internet, digitization, and sharing economies provide
for creators. The other major problem with this rhetoric is that it is scarcely
supported by empirical evidence. The Draft Directive’s Impact Assessment
admits this by noting that “economic impacts are mostly assessed from a
qualitative point of view” and that no quantitative analysis of the impacts
48

See Martin Husovec, EC Proposes Stay-down & Expanded Obligation to License UGC Services,
HUT’KO’S TECH. LAW BLOG, (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.husovec.eu/2016/09/ec-proposes-stay-downexpanded.html [https://perma.cc/CYG5-LZF9].
49
See, e.g., Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgericht in München [OLG] [Higher Regional Court],
29 U 2798/15 Jan. 28, 2016 (Ger.) (ruling against GEMA, a performers’ rights organization in
Germany, in holding that YouTube could not be held liable for damages for hosting copyrighted content
without the copyright holder’s permission).
50
See, e.g., Press Release, GEMA, EU Copyright Modernisation: First Steps Towards a Fair and
Balanced Relationship Between Authors & Online Platforms (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.gema.de/
en/aktuelles/eu_urheberrechtsreform_erste_schritte_zu_einem_fairen_ausgleich_zwischen_urhebern_un
d_online_plattf [https://perma.cc/5K8H-LFBR].
51
See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/AJ5P-RJZF] (last visited June 5, 2017).
52
See Letter from Am. Ass’n of Indep. Music et al. to Donald J. Trump, President-Elect of the
United States (Dec.13, 2016) http://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Letter-to-POTUSEfrom-Music-Community-121316.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6EM-597U].
53
See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 54–82 (Yale
University Press 2008).
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of the different policy options was undertaken because of “[t]he limited
availability of data in this area.”54 The European Copyright Society
reinforced this point by stating that they “are disappointed to see that the
proposals are not grounded in any solid scientific (in particular, economic)
evidence.”55 In reality, there is no clear evidence on the scale, nature, or
effects of copyright infringement in the digital environment, or the
effectiveness of more aggressive enforcement strategies. In an authoritative
report commissioned by the UK government, Professor Ian Hargreaves
noted the major problem with this lack of empirical evidence: that
copyright policies should be based on hard and transparent evidence, and
so far none has been provided.56
Professor Hargreaves is correct: in crafting the European Digital
Single Market Strategy, clear empirical evidence should have been
carefully reviewed to consider whether creators and the creative market as
a whole have been withering or flourishing. So far, independent empirical
evidence supporting the present enforcement strategy has never been
provided. Also never considered was contrary evidence that might
emphasize positive externalities for creativity of the internet, digitization,
and platform economy. This contrary evidence is plentiful. The literature
has consistently shown that, in reality, the digital platform economy has
created value for content providers, not a value gap that needs to be
closed.57 Empirical studies have shown that in the digital environment, “the
sky is rising,” rather than falling, as far as creative industries are
concerned.58 Piracy has forced the market to adapt to user needs,59 and the
market has in fact adapted by offering new and more affordable ways to

54

European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the
Modernisation of EU Copyright Rules, 136, SWD (2016) 301 final PART 1/3 (Sept. 14, 2016).
55
European Copyright Society, General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package (January
24, 2017), 5, https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinion-on-eucopyright-reform-def.pdf.
56
See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GROWTH 10 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES 4, 4–11 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (making the same point).
57
See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Digital Piracy Debunked: A Short Note on Digital Threats and
Intermediary Liability, INTERNET POL’Y REV., Mar. 2016, at 1-22 (discussing in details the empirical
studies cited below).
58
See MICHAEL MASNICK AND MICHAEL HO, FLOOR 64, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 3 (2012); see also Joel Waldfogel, Is the Sky
Falling? The Quality of New Recorded Music Since Napster, VOX (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/ 7274 [https://perma.cc/2HJU-LW56].
59
See generally ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG
TO GATES (U. of Chicago Press 2009).
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enjoy creativity.60 This narrative, and empirical economic studies that
support it, are nowhere to be found in the impact assessment justifying the
draft directive or in the larger institutional debate surrounding it.
A. Ancillary Rights for Publishers
A groundbreaking provision aimed at closing the value gap—and
affecting directly online intermediaries—is the introduction of a
neighboring right for press publishers for the digital uses of their
publication.61 This new sui generis right would last for twenty years from
the date of the publication.62 It would also apply retroactively to press
publications already published.63
Allegedly, the introduction of this neighboring right for press
publishers is based on the assumption that “[i]n the transition from print to
digital, publishers of press publications are facing problems in licensing the
online use of their publications and recouping their investments.”64
According to the Impact Assessment, without this right, press publishers
would curb their investment in the digital press publishing market due to
complex and inefficient licensing and enforcement in the digital
environment.65 However, the Impact Assessment does not provide any
evidence to support this conclusion.66 Also, in advance of the Directive
proposal, several leading European scholars have already advised against
the introduction of any neighboring rights for publishers, making
arguments based on empirical effects on market efficiency.67 To put it
60

See CREATE COPYRIGHT RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF GLASGOW, Copyright Evidence,
COPYRIGHT EVIDENCE WIKI (Nov. 14, 2016, 2:33 PM), http://www.copyrightevidence.org
[https://perma.cc/KPG9-NFB8] (trying to establish a body of evidence that allows better decisionmaking in the contested copyright policy field).
61
See DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, Art. 11 (providing “publishers of press publications
with the rights” of reproduction and making them available to the public “for the digital use of their
press publications”).
62
Id. Neighboring rights—or related rights—are characterized by the fact that they are created for
rightholders’ categories that are not technically authors and might share only some of the requirements
of traditional copyright and have a different scope of protection.
63
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, Art. 18.
64
Id.
65
See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the Modernisation of EU
Copyright Rules, at 175–92, SWD (2016) 301 final, PART 3/3 (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Impact
Assessment]; DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, at 18–19.
66
See Impact Assessment, supra note 65, at 175–92.
67
See Martin Kretschmer, Séverine Dusollier, Christophe Geiger & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The
European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Role of Publishers in the Copyright Value Chain:
A Response by the European Copyright Society, 38 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 591, 591–
595 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801595 [https://perma.cc/63QBSH3D]; RETO M. HILTY, KAYA KÖKLÜ & VALENTINA MOSCON, POSITION STATEMENT OF THE MAX
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bluntly, the causality between the demise of traditional press publishing
and the growth of new information society services, such as online news
aggregators—and hence the need for granting new neighboring rights—
was never shown.68 Apparently, this reform is also based on a marketingdriven, industry-led narrative, rather than empirical evidence showing a
causal link between inefficiencies in the market and the legal instruments
proposed.
This proposal follows in the footsteps of press publishers’ rights
created by a limited number of Member States. Similar arrangements
enacted in Spain and Germany already stirred up quite a debate.69 Empirical
evidence collected after the enactment of these neighboring rights showed
that the reforms were ineffective and altogether detrimental. In Germany,
the law did not achieve the desired results.70 Actually, German press
publishers authorized Google to index their publications and feature them
in Google’s news and search services free of charge.71 Some smaller news
aggregation services operating in Germany delisted press publishers or
stopped using snippets.72 In Spain, the adoption of the law also led to
unexpected results.73 First, Google shut down its Spanish Google News
service. In addition, recent empirical evidence confirmed that news
aggregators had a positive effect on online news sites in Spain, which
PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION ON THE “PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE
ROLE OF PUBLISHERS IN THE COPYRIGHT VALUE CHAIN” (2016), http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/
pubman/item/escidoc:2321286:3/component/escidoc:2436801/MPI_Position_statement_15_6_2016_de
f.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ3W-UY9S]; Eleonora Rosati, Neighbouring Rights for Publishers: Are
National and (Possible) EU Initiatives Lawful?, 47 INT’L REV. INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 569, 571, 585 (2016); Alexander Peukert, An EU Related Right for Press Publishers Concerning
Digital Uses. A Legal Analysis §§ 5-13 (Goethe Univ. Frankfurt am Main Research Paper No. 22/2016,
2016), https://www.eco.de/wp-content/blogs.dir/copyright_-legal-analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL5J9RQM].
68
See Susana Navas Navarro, Periódicos Digitales y Agregadores de Contenido Informativo en
España [Digital Newspapers and Aggregators of News Content in Spain], 246 Revue Internationale du
Droit d’Auteur 72, 120–25 (2015).
69
See Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko & Giancarlo Frosio, Opinion of the CEIPI on the
European Commission’s Copyright Reform Proposal with a Focus on the Introduction of Neighbouring
Rights for Press Publishers in EU Law 5–8 (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Stud. Research Paper No.
2016-01, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921334 [https://perma.cc/UXN2NWLV] (reviewing these national legislations).
70
See Andreas Becker, German Publishers Vs. Google, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.dw.com/en/german-publishers-vs-google/a-18030444
[https://perma.cc/K2QA-F6LN];
Raquel Xalabarder, Press Publisher Rights in the New Copyright in the Digital Single Market Draft
Directive 16–17 (Ctr. for Copyright & New Bus. Models Creative Econ. Working Paper 2016/15,
2016), http://www.create.ac.uk/publications/press-publisher-rights-in-the-new-copyright-in-the-digitalsingle-market-draft-directive/ [https://perma.cc/P85B-M2QQ].
71
Id.
72
See Kretschmer, Dusollier, Geiger & Hugenholtz, supra note 67, at 594.
73
See Xalabarder, supra note 70, at 17–21.
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directly contradicts the predictions in the Impact Assessment and the
Directive Proposal.74 The study found that in the first three months of 2015,
the closing of Google News and a number of smaller news aggregation
services led to a decline of more than six percent of internet traffic to
Spanish newspapers.75 Because news aggregators have a “market expansion
effect,”76 the closing of the news aggregators particularly hurt small
publications by decreasing the number of new visitors to their sites.77 It also
created barriers to innovation for other information intermediaries that
compile customized services based on users’ online activities or aggregate
content for mobile phones, as well as algorithmic aggregators designed to
deliver dynamic content.78
These findings show troubling potential negative externalities of the
reform, especially in terms of access to information (and therefore
democratization) and innovation policy. First, the proposal might
negatively impact smaller publishers, and therefore promote a
recentralization of online news outlets. This would detract from the
diversity of information on the internet, limit users’ access to information,
and hinder democratization.79 The literature explaining why centralization
hinders democratization is plentiful.80 As Jerome Barron argued, a
democratic system should aim to decentralize information.81 In general,
concentrated systems are likely to exclude challenges to prevailing
wisdom82 and translate unequal distribution of economic power into

74

See Pedro Posada de la Concha, Alberto Gutiérrez García & Hugo Hernández Cobos, NERA
ECON. CONSULTING, IMPACTO DEL NUEVO ARTÍCULO 32.2 DE LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL:
INFORME PARA LA ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE EDITORIALES DE PUBLICACIONES PERIÓDICAS (AEEPP)
[IMPACT OF THE NEW ARTICLE 32.2 OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: STUDY FOR THE SPANISH
ASSOCIATION OF PUBLISHERS OF PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS], at xiii (2015), http://www.aeepp.com/
pdf/InformeNera.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH2L-XHV3].
75
Id. at xii.
76
The phrase “market expansion effect” refers to the ability of news aggregators to drive visitors to
news websites who would otherwise not have visited those websites. Id. at x.
77
Id. at xiv.
78
Id. at xii.
79
See Peukert, supra note 67, at §§ 186–94.
80
See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967) [hereinafter Barron, Access to the Press]; Jerome A. Barron, Access—The Only Choice for
the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766 (1970) [hereinafter Barron, The Only Choice]; see also Neil
Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s Contextual First Amendment and Copyright
in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952 (2008); Yochai Benkler, A Speakers’ Corner Under the
Sun, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 291 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel
eds., 2002).
81
See Barron, The Only Choice, supra note 80.
82
See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 80, at 1641–47.
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unequal distribution of power to express ideas.83 Media concentration
creates disparities in the ability to be heard.84 A study on the state of the
implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions85 in Europe noted that,
while some copyright is necessary, too much copyright is detrimental to
diversity of cultural expression.86 Diversity of cultural expression is
particularly threatened by intellectual property rights “in markets that are
dominated by big corporations exercising collective power as
oligopolies.”87 This process of concentration endangers cultural diversity in
that “a handful—six to ten vertically integrated communications
companies—will soon produce, own, and distribute the bulk of the culture
and information circulating in the global marketplace.”88
Second, the creation of new neighboring rights enjoying retroactive
effects would remove material from the public domain and consequently
impinge freedom of expression and democratization.89 The enclosure of the
public domain enhances centralized media’s market power, while
proportionally disincentivizing decentralization. The public domain is a
metaphysical public forum that “belong[s] to everyone, because [it]
belong[s] to no one, from which people cannot be excluded on the grounds
that a property owner wishes to exclude them.”90 Thus, “[t]he public
83

See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412–13 (1986);
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 404–12 (1990).
84
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 362
(1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1879–82 (2000); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and ‘Market Power’ in
the Marketplace of Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 149, 160–62 (François Lévêque &
Howard Shelanski eds., 2005); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary
Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000).
85
See U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION
OF THE DIVERSITY OF CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS (2005).
86
GERMANN AVOCATS, IMPLEMENTING THE UNESCO CONVENTION OF 2005 IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 26, 76–78 (2010), http://www.diversitystudy.eu/ms/ep_study_long_version_20_nov_2010_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4BS-H38Y] (study prepared for the European Parliament).
87
Id. at 26.
88
RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 38 (1996).
89
For a discussion of the negative effects of the enclosure of the public domain for European
citizens, see GIANCARLO F. FROSIO, COMMUNIA, COMMUNIA FINAL REPORT (2011),
http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/D1.11-COMMUNIA%20Final%20Report-nov2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KS3U-99HC] (report prepared for the European Commission on behalf of the
COMMUNIA Network and the NEXA Center); see also Xalabarder, supra note 70, at 22–24 (noting
that this proposal completely upsets the dichotomy between unprotected information and protected
expressions embedded in copyright law).
90
Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
597, 598 (2007).
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domain represents our free speech concerns within the realm of copyright
law.”91 Consequently, any increase or decrease in the public domain will
proportionally affect our freedom of speech.
In addition, the public domain promotes rich and diverse expressions
regardless of the market power of the speakers, as there are no costs
inherent in utilizing the public domain. Any decrease in the public domain
will produce the most direct repercussions on people with less ability to
finance the dissemination of their speech. Copyright expansion favors
organizations that own large information inventories over smaller
organizations and individuals who will have to buy access to the
information that is removed from the public domain.92 Thus, any
contraction of the public domain will work against the goal of bringing “the
millions of dispossessed and disadvantaged . . . in from the margins of
society, and cultural policy in from the margins of governance.”93
These consequences are especially likely to follow from the removal
of information from the online public marketplace, as the internet is “a
driver of greater pluralism in the media, giving both access to a wider range
of sources and points of view as well as the means for individuals—who
might otherwise be denied the opportunity—to express themselves fully
and openly.”94 The internet changed freedom of expression’s focus from the
right of a few privileged speakers to address the masses to the right of each
person to participate in a “democratic culture.”95
Third, introducing neighboring rights for press publishers would act as
a strong disincentive for innovators, as it would back up property owners’
attempts to leverage their holdout power to block progress. Anticompetitive
behaviors are common in this context, and property owners repeatedly try
91

Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 59, 62 (Lucie Guibault & P.
Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); see also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 393 (1999).
92
Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information Goods vs.
The Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267, 273–74 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2001).
93
EUROPEAN TASK FORCE ON CULTURE & DEV., IN FROM THE MARGINS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE
DEBATE ON CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 7 (1997) (report prepared for the Council of
Europe).
94
Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Agenda for
Europe, at 30, COM (2010) 245 final (May 19, 2010).
95
See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (arguing that digital technologies
should change the focus of free speech theory from a concern for protecting democratic process to a
larger concern promoting and protecting a democratic culture).
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to leverage their holdout power. This behavior applies to property at large,96
but it surfaced often throughout the history of copyright in particular.97 This
time, innovators will be disincentivized from developing technologies that
compile and aggregate content on the internet.
Finally, an additional point should be stressed in connection with the
overall scope of this reform process. Ancillary rights to press publication
for online uses would delay, rather than promote, the Digital Single
Market. The introduction of an additional layer of twenty-eight national
rights would certainly lead to further challenges related to fragmentation
and territoriality of rights.98 In addition, as there is already no uniform
approach to exceptions or limitations to twenty-eight national authors’
rights—which has led to considerable uncertainty in that area of the law—
allowing the creation of twenty-eight additional national rights for
publishers would have the same result, which is exactly what the Digital
Single Market is designed to avoid.99
B. Platforms’ Revenue-Share Agreements and Filtering
The proposed reform also includes a second provision that would
impact platform operations broadly. It requires intermediaries “that store
and provide to the public access to large amounts of works . . . uploaded by
their users” to take appropriate and proportionate “measures to [either]
ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the
use of their works” or “prevent the availability on their services of [such]
works,” including through “the use of effective content recognition
technologies.”100 Put bluntly, under this provision, UGC platforms would
have to shoulder more responsibility for rooting out infringements and
share revenues with creators.
The scope of the provision is still to be determined. In particular,
Recital 38(1-2) of the proposal—read together with Article 13—might
cause some interpretive headaches.101 Apparently, the new proposal would
96

See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 749–50, 752 (1986) (discussing how large public projects such as
highways or railroads are vulnerable to the holdout power of single property owners).
97
See Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for Copyright Reform,
33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 786–92 (2006) (sketching a quick history of holdouts on cultural technological
advancements); see also Giancarlo F. Frosio, Google Books Rejected: Taking the Orphans to the
Digital Public Library of Alexandria, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 81, 128–130
(2011) (reviewing the relevant case law).
98
See Geiger, Bulayenko & Frosio, supra note 69, at 8.
99
Id., at 9–10.
100
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, at Art. 13, cl. 1.
101
Id., at 1–5.
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apply to active hosting providers. The proposal refers only to those who
“store and provide access” to protected works, which restricts the
proposal’s scope to hosting providers.102 If a hosting provider is not eligible
for the liability exemption established by Article 14 of the eCommerce
Directive, it is obliged to enter into licensing agreements with
rightholders.103 For the Article 14 exemption not to apply, a hosting
provider must “play an active role.”104 In defining a hosting provider that
plays an active role, Recital 38 of the proposal states that it must go
“beyond the mere provision of physical facilities.”105 Redeploying the
language from L’Oréal v. eBay, the proposal notes that playing an active
role “includ[es] . . . optimising the presentation of the uploaded works or
subject-matter or promoting them, irrespective of the nature of the means
used therefor.”106 By referring to L’Oréal, the proposal might also imply
that a hosting provider can still be protected even if it is not completely
passive as long as it does not have knowledge or control over the data
being stored.107 Therefore, it is unclear whether sharing platforms like
YouTube, Dailymotion, or Soundcloud qualify as an active host under the
proposal.108
There are also several textual issues with this proposal that would
need clarification—especially the notion of “large amounts” of works
whose scope of application becomes impossible to determine.109 However,
there is one aspect of the debate surrounding the proposal that has become
increasingly sensitive, especially due to recent activism of the CJEU that
might be aligning its jurisprudence to the positions held by the Commission
in the DSM Draft Directive. Apparently, the proposal implies that hosting
providers that do not just merely provide physical facilities, and “thereby”
perform an act of communication to the public.110 The Commission has
reinforced this statement elsewhere. The Communication on Online
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011, I-06119, ¶

116.
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See L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-06119, ¶¶ 112–16; see also Van Eecke, supra note 3, at 1472–74
(supporting a “storage but no knowledge” test).
108
See Eleonora Rosati, Why a Reform of Hosting Providers’ Safe Harbour is Unnecessary under
EU Copyright Law (CREATe Working Paper 2016/11, August 2016).
109
For a full discussion of these textual issues and an in-depth analysis of the proposal, see
Giancarlo Frosio & Christophe Geiger, Reaction of CEIPI to the European Commission’s Proposal on
Certain Uses of Protected Content by Online Services (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Studies Position
Paper) (forthcoming 2017) (on file with the author).
110
Id.

35

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Platforms and the Digital Single Market noted that rebalancing is needed
because “[n]ew forms of online content distribution have emerged that may
make copyright-protected content uploaded by end-users widely
available.111 The Commission characterizes platforms as actively “making
available” content uploaded by end-users and considers doing so an act of
communication to the public. The reasons for this characterization are quite
apparent. If platforms communicate to the public, they would be potentially
liable for copyright infringement. Therefore, providers can be obliged to
enter into licensing agreements, rather than enter monetization agreements
on a voluntary basis.
However, characterizing hosting providers as “communicating to the
public” has never been an obvious conclusion under EU law. First, the
apparent implication that, unless liability exemptions apply, intermediaries
storing and providing public access to protected works would be
communicating to the public is novel. Actually, there is no direct relation
between liability and exemptions, which function as an extra layer of
protection intended to harmonize at the EU level conditions to limit
intermediary liability.112 The inapplicability of the exemptions does not
imply as such that online intermediaries would be liable.
In addition, the proposal, by characterizing active hosts as
communicating to the public, would make them directly liable, rather than
secondarily liable as commonly understood. According to the European
Court of Justice, communicating to the public requires that the user must—
in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions—give access to the
protected work to an additional public so that, absent that indispensable
intervention, that “new” public is unable to enjoy the work.113 As end-users
physically upload the work—while online intermediaries do not—they first
become that necessary indispensable intervention enabling the new public
to enjoy the protected work. However, recent CJEU case law has been
transitioning to an apparently looser standard, focusing on the essential,
rather than the indispensable, role of the user.114 This, in turn, would make
it easier to construe hosting providers as communicating to the public.
111

See OP&DSM Communication, supra note 34, at 8 (emphasis added).
See Frosio & Geiger, supra note 109.
113
See Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores v. Rafael Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519, I11558; Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Assoc. Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I9083, I-9239.
114
See Case C-527/15, Stiching Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems, ECLI:EU:C:2017:300, ¶ 32
(finding communication to the public in the sale of a multimedia player with pre-installed add-ons,
available on the internet, containing hyperlinks to freely accessible website that makes infringing
materials available); Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, XS4ALL Internet BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, ¶ 37.
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Recent CJEU case law qualified this notion of essential intervention by
extending it to circumstances not only where, absent that intervention,
customers would not be able to access the work, but also where they
“would be able to do so only with difficulty.”115 In particular, Ziggo,
discussed below, concludes that without the operators of the platform
ThePirateBay (TPB) making the platform available and managing it, the
users could not share the works or, “at the very least, sharing them on the
internet would prove to be more complex.”116
Actually, intermediaries have already been held directly liable for
their users’ copyright infringement, but only when their involvement in the
infringement is so substantial that they have been found to have
communicated the works themselves, rather than being used by others to
perform the communication.117 This line of argument might still distinguish
Ziggo—and Wullems—from cases involving UGC platforms targeted by
the upcoming reform. In Ziggo, the TPB provided a vast array of
functions—such as indexing, categorization, deletion and filtering—that
obviously set the platform apart from any mere provision of physical
facilities and trespass into a conduct intentionally aimed at facilitating
infringement.118 In both cases, the CJEU found a specific design to induce
copyright infringement, including advertisement or operators’ comments
on blogs and forums encouraging users to access and download infringing
content.119 It found that both technologies were primarily designed to
infringe copyright, considering, for example, that almost the totality of files
shared on the TPB platform infringe copyright.120 Absent all these
cumulative circumstances—such as might be the case for UGC sharing
115

See C-610/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 26.
Id. at ¶ 36.
117
Standards have varied greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, in the UK, there is
clear distinction between primary and secondary infringement, setting a high bar for finding
intermediaries directly liable. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Newzbin
Ltd. [2010] EWHC
(Ch)
608,
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See C-527/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 18 and 50; C-610/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 45. Cf. MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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platforms like YouTube, DailyMotion or Soundcloud—traditionally,
intermediaries have been held secondarily liable, rather than primarily. In
most EU jurisdictions, secondary liability requires highly demanding
conditions that are derived from miscellaneous doctrines of tort law,121 such
as the doctrines of joint tortfeasance, authorization, inducement, common
design, contributory liability, vicarious liability, or extra-contractual
liability.122 In contrast, according to the proposal, intermediary services
would automatically be assumed to be infringing and directly liable for
infringements materially committed by others. Although recent CJEU case
law reinforces the position upheld by the proposal,123 it still might be overinclusive and stretch “communication to the public” too far. The broad
application of “communication to the public” sought by the Commission’s
proposal would wind the clock back to the debates in the 1990s, when the
introduction of safe harbor provisions for online intermediaries won the
day by a narrow margin over initial proposals that held intermediaries fully
liable for copyright infringement.124
The proposal encourages the use of effective content recognition
technologies, such as YouTube’s Content ID or other automatic
121

See Kamiel Koelman & Bernt Hugenholtz, Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright
Infringement, (Workshop on Serv. Provider Liab., Geneva, Switz.), Nov. 22, 1999, at 5–8,
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UNION: NORMATIVE REALITIES AND TRENDS, 119 (Tanel Kerikmäe ed., Springer Int’l Publ’g. 2014)
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345–53 (2010).
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See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 114–24 (1995), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/
ipnii.pdf [perma.cc/V7G4-RDLN].
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infringement assessment systems, to prevent the availability of infringing
content. In practice, the proposal would de facto force intermediaries to
develop and deploy monitoring and filtering systems. This proposal follows
in the footsteps of a well-established path in recent intermediary liability
policy. Recent case law has imposed proactive monitor obligations on
intermediaries for copyright infringement—such as Allostreaming in
France, Dafra in Brazil, RapidShare in Germany, or Baidu in China.125
Actually, the emerging enforcement of proactive monitoring obligations
has been spanning the entire spectrum of intermediary liability subject
matters: intellectual property, privacy, defamation, and hate/dangerous
speech.126 In this context, however, notable exceptions—such as the
landmark Belen case in Argentina—also highlight a fragmented
international response to intermediary liability.127 There might be a wellmarked trend in intermediary liability policy leading to the death of “no
monitoring obligations.”128 Current internet policy—especially in Europe—
is silently drifting away from a fundamental safeguard for users’ freedom
of expression online that has guarded against any “invisible handshake”
between rightholders, online intermediaries, and governments.
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At first glance, inconsistency with the EU acquis might irremediably
plague the introduction of filtering obligations. The introduction of any
filtering technology—thereby imposing a de facto general monitoring
obligation as, in order to filter unwanted content, all content must be
monitored129—would inevitably call into question necessary coordination
with the eCommerce Directive. Apparently, this proposal would contradict
the eCommerce Directive’s intermediary liability regime—in particular the
no-monitoring rule set out in Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive.130 The
eCommerce Directive prohibits general monitoring obligations, although it
does allow national law to provide for monitoring obligations “in a specific
case.”131 In order to distinguish general from specific monitoring
obligations, it should be considered that (1) as an exception, specific
monitoring obligations must be interpreted narrowly, (2) both the scope of
the possible infringements and the amount of infringements that can be
reasonably expected to be identified must be sufficiently narrow, and (3) it
must be obvious which materials constitute an infringement.132 According
to the above, the proposed obligation would fall in the former category,
rather than the latter.133
It goes without saying, the proposal openly conflicts with consistent—
and unambiguous—European jurisprudence. The European Court of Justice
has reinforced the position that there is no room for general proactive
monitoring and filtering mechanisms under EU law.134 In multiple cases,
the Court has decided that the eCommerce Directive trumps conflicting
measures in other intellectual property legislation.135 In SABAM v. Netlog,
the Court specifically referenced hosting providers, using language that
unmistakably covers the proposal in Article 13. According to the ECJ,
European law must be interpreted as preventing nations from requiring a
hosting provider to install a system for filtering: (1) information which is
stored on its servers by its service users; (2) which applies indiscriminately
129
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to all of those users; (3) as a preventative measure; (4) exclusively at its
expense; and (5) for an unlimited period, (6) which is capable of
identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic, or audiovisual works.136
Also, this proposal is systemically inconsistent with EU law because it
would create a strict liability regime, rather than a negligence-based
regime.137 At present, the eCommerce intermediary liability regime can be
categorized as a negligence regime based on actual or constructive
knowledge.138 The hosting exemption works according to a notice and take
down regime: upon knowledge of the infringement occurring through its
services, the intermediary must act expeditiously to remove the infringing
materials.139 Introducing a strict liability system for online intermediaries
will upset the delicate balance between copyright protection and other
fundamental rights like access to information, freedom of expression, and
freedom of business. Intermediaries should be governed by the general
rules of civil liability (based on negligence), not strict liability IP rules. In
the words of the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice—
which, although crafted in the context of trademark infringement online,
would apply mutatis mutandis to copyright as well:
Liability rules are more appropriate, since they do not fundamentally change
the decentralised nature of the internet by giving trade mark proprietors
general—and virtually absolute—control over the use in cyberspace of
keywords which correspond to their trade marks. Instead of being able to
prevent, through trade mark protection, any possible use—including, as has
been observed, many lawful and even desirable uses—trade mark proprietors
would have to point to specific instances giving rise to Google’s liability in
the context of illegal damage to their trade marks.140

A negligence-based system would better balance the people’s right to
information, freedom of expression, and freedom of business with the
protection of copyrights.
Filtering technologies—in a related fashion to that just mentioned
above—might conflict with fundamental rights by erring on the side of
copyright protection. According to the ECJ, filtering would not be as “fair
136
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and proportionate” as the proposal suggests.141 Instead, filtering
technologies would rather fail to strike a “fair balance” between copyright
and other fundamental rights.142 They would undermine users’ freedom of
expression and right to privacy143 and the provider’s freedom to conduct
business.144 In particular, in the words of the European Court of Justice,
these measures “could potentially undermine freedom of information, since
that system might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and
lawful content.”145 First, automatic infringement assessment systems might
undermine the enjoyment of users’ exceptions and limitations.146 Digital
rights management’s effects on exceptions and limitations have been
highlighted by copious literature.147 Similar conclusions apply to this
scenario. Automated systems cannot replace human judgment flagging a
certain use as fair—or within the scope of an exception or limitation.148
Also, complexities regarding the public domain status of certain works, for
example, might confuse the content recognition technologies.149 At the
present level of technological sophistication, false positives (content
incorrectly flagged as protected) would have chilling effects that would
undermine freedom of information, expression, and possibly business.
Finally, monitoring obligations erect barriers to innovation by making
it more expensive for platforms to enter and compete in the market. The
proposal’s suggested monitoring obligations would force intermediaries to
develop and deploy costly technology.150 The ECJ has emphasized in the
past that such an obligation “would result in a serious infringement of the
freedom of the hosting service provider to conduct its business.”151 In
particular, according to the ECJ, this obligation would be contrary to
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Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive, which provides that “procedures
and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual
property rights . . . shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly . . . and
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to
legitimate trade.”152 Whether technology is too costly—therefore limiting
market incentives for present market players—might be up to debate as
shown by the Allostreaming case in France and the Dafra case in Brazil.153
In both cases Google’s so-called “technical defense”—asserting that
filtering was too costly and therefore technically unfeasible—was refuted
by the courts on the basis of expert-testimony reports to the contrary.154 In
any event, the proposal’s suggested monitoring obligation would have the
most negative effect on companies that do not currently own any
proprietary recognition technology, widening the gap between established
and upcoming intermediaries. In particular, European intermediaries will
be at a disadvantage because they will have to license filtering technologies
from US companies like Google/YouTube and Audible Magic155 because
currently no European companies make competitive filtering technologies.
As most established market players are US-based, this proposal might once
again be a bad tradeoff for European companies—and push the Digital
Single Market further away, rather than promoting it.
C. Notice and Take-Down, Notice and Action, Notice and Stay-Down
The proposal would also require intermediaries to “put in place
complaints and redress mechanisms that are available to users in case of
disputes” over filtered content.156 The proposal does not develop further on
how this counter-notice mechanism should work in practice. It does not
provide for the development of best practices or standardization for
counter-notices, while it does so for filtering mechanisms.157 More
importantly, little or nothing is known on how filtering measures will work
in practice. Should intermediaries filter everything under the sun? Should
they apply recognition technologies only to a preexisting blacklist of
protected works? Most likely, the specifics of both the filtering and redress
system might result from voluntary efforts and best practices promoted by
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the industry alone, resembling closely a sectorial notice-and-take-down
system.
In this regard, it is odd that the proposal requires intermediaries to
provide a redress mechanism for proactive takedowns, while overlooking
the issue of a legislatively mandated—and long-awaited—horizontal
notice-and-take-down system under the eCommerce Directive
framework.158 For the sake of systemic consistency, EU law should first set
up a general notice-and-take-down and counter-notice system.159 However,
this is apparently not likely: as mentioned in the OP&DSM
Communication, EU-wide notice-and-action procedures will be postponed
for now as the Commission will assess the impact of ongoing reforms
first.160
For the future, a couple of additional options—besides the
aforementioned horizontal notice-and-takedown system—are being
considered. First, a sectorial, problem-driven approach might utilize noticeand-action procedures with different requirements for the content of the
notice.161 According to the results of the Consultation on Online
Intermediaries, different categories of illegal content require different
notice-and-action procedures, especially content related to intellectual
property rights, child abuse content, racism, and xenophobia.162 Second, the
Enforcement Directive might also be amended to explicitly establish that
national courts must be allowed to order intermediaries to take measures
aimed not only at ending past and ongoing infringements, but also at
preventing further infringements. In that respect, according to the
Consultation on Modernization of IPRs’ Enforcement, the Directive should
establish criteria on how “take down and stay down” should be undertaken
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without establishing a general monitoring obligation.163 The viability of this
approach remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
The upcoming European Digital Single Market reform endorses a
reaction to the platform economy that might prove a bad policy approach.
A narrative emphasizing the “value gap”—rather than the added value—of
the platform economy is counter-intuitive and disconnected from empirical
evidence. The Commission’s reform package is apparently based solely on
content industry assumptions and ignores much evidence that shows the
positive effects that platforms, the internet, and digitization have had on
creativity. Overlooking this empirical evidence might result in a reform that
will prove obsolete before it is implemented, and possibly be detrimental
for the Digital Single Market.
In addition, the present reform proposal might threaten systemic
consistency. The reform suggests revising intermediary liability principles
through a so-called “sectorial approach,” rather than amending the
eCommerce Directive. This policy strategy is a sloppy attempt to
circumvent the lack of consensus behind an amendment to the present
intermediary liability regimes that might create unavoidable conflicts
between norms. Intermediary liability reform should happen first and
foremost in the context of the eCommerce Directive, rather than through
sectorial copyright and audio-visual reform or the promotion of voluntary
self-regulatory actions.
Finally, the proposed EU reform deploys a strategy that would
apparently turn online intermediaries into internet police. In truth, this
comes as little surprise. Since the inception of the internet, governments
and IP rightholders have attempted to enlist intermediaries to rid the
internet of allegedly infringing and illicit materials. Proactive monitoring
and “notice and stay-down” regimes would definitely be a step in that
direction. Meanwhile, the endorsement of voluntary measures as a
privileged tool to curb illicit and infringing activities online makes
intermediaries prone to serve governmental purposes under murky,
privately-enforced standards, rather than transparent legal obligations duly
enforced by delegated agencies or the judiciary. In this sense, the
intermediary liability discourse is shifting towards an intermediary
responsibility discourse. This process might be pushing an amorphous
notion of responsibility that incentivizes intermediaries’ self-intervention to
police allegedly infringing activities on the internet. Under this approach,
163
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due process and fundamental guarantees are replaced by algorithmic
enforcement, silencing speech according to the mainstream ethical
discourse. Ironically, such reforms might end up achieving the opposite of
a culturally independent European Digital Single Market by promoting
globalized enforcement via algorithms developed and controlled by major
Silicon Valley companies.
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